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RECENT DECISIONS

whose exit might be seriously detrimental to the national security.
More specifically, a question arises where the disclosure of the reasons for denying an individual's passport or the government's confidential sources of information might be equally deleterious to the
country's welfare. It seems that some specific legislation could be
passed which would both relieve the government of this dilemma and
still effectively safeguard the right of the individual. Nonetheless,
until further specific legislation is passed, the Secretary's discretionary
power is limited to the areas in which it had been generally exercised
since 1856 and the regulations hinging upon the "interests38 of the
Just
United States" clause have been substantially invalidated.
how specific such legislation must be is presently a divided question. 39
The Worthy case has affirmed the Secretary's right to place area restrictions upon travel for all Americans. Whether, and to what extent, an individual can be so restricted, are the still unanswered
questions which now await further legislation before the court has
an opportunity to consider them.

M
CONTRACTS-ECONOMIc DURE S-THREAT TO SELL PROPERTY
TO

AN

"UNDESIRABLE

PARTY"

HELD

SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE

DuREs.-Defendant-builder and plaintiffs-purchasers entered into an
agreement calling for the construction of a house in the defendant's
housing development. The contract provided for the making of a
,cash down payment. The plaintiffs, after making the down payment,
desired to be released from the contract and recover the purchase
money paid. Upon defendant's refusal to release them, plaintiffs
allegedly threatened to resell the house to an "undesirable person"
for the purpose of damaging the builder's business unless he acceded
to the plaintiffs' terms. Defendant agreed but thereafter refused to
return the money. Plaintiffs sued on the release agreement. The
lower court held for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Court reversed,
holding that if the threats were in fact made and the builder actually
believed they would be carried out and his will was thereby overcome, he was justified in treating the original contract as breached
and was entitled to recover whatever damages resulted therefrom.
Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (1959).
38 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1957) ; accord, Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
1443(1957).

9See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES OF THE AssociATiroN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

FREEDom To TRAvL 81-86 (1958) ; Jaffe, The Right to Travel; The Passport
Problem, 35 FOREIGNAFFAIRs 17, 27-28 (1956); Boudin, The Constitutional
Right to Travel, 56 COLUTm. L. REv. 47, 72-77 (1956); Comment, 61 YALE L.T.
171, 198-201 (1952).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 34

The primary purpose of the duress doctrine is the prevention
of unjust enrichment.' In the majority of duress cases, the coerced
party is seeking restitution of transfers or payments made in settlement of a non-existent debt.2 Other cases involve transactions induced by duress contemplating an exchange of values through
payments made, property transferred or services rendered by the
coercing party.3 As a condition to rescission the party under duress4
will be required to tender or account for the value received by him.
"A contract obtained by duress is not ordinarily void, but is merely
voidable, and a party seeking to avoid such a contract must act
promptly to repudiate it. .

. ."

5

Judicial intervention, in situations of undue economic pressure,
was recognized in a few areas in early English jurisprudence. 6 The
doctrine of duress of goods developed with the courts' realization
of the unfortunate plight of a merchant whose goods are illegally
withheld. In such circumstances the merchant could hardly protect
himself adequately. 7 "Freedom of Contract," the recognition and
encouragement of each man's initiative and ambition by giving him
the right to use his economic powers to the fullest, and the courts'
reluctance to concern themselves with the equivalence of the consideration for a promise were in the main the deterrent factors in
the recognition of economic pressure as a form of duress.8
The modern tendency of courts of law is to regard any transaction as voidable in which the party seeking to avoid was coerced to
enter by the fear of the wrongful act of the other party. 9 Although
the pressure extended in most cases is wrongful, i.e., the person
exerting the influence is doing it by an unlawful means, the courts
have recognized that although coercive means may be lawful they
must not be so oppressively used as to amount to an abuse of legal
remedy.10
I Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L. REV.
253, 282 (1947).
2 Id. at 283.
3 Id. at 284.
4 Graham v. Fisher, 244 App. Div. 740, 278 N.Y. Supp. 982 (2d Dep't
1935), aFf'd mem., 273 N.Y. 652, 8 N.E.2d 331 (1937).
5 In the Matter of Minkin, 279 App. Div. 226, 233, 108 N.Y.S.2d 945,
954 (2d Dep't 1951) (concurring opinion), aff'd iner., 304 N.Y. 617, 107
N.E.2d 94 (1952).
6 Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 241 (1942).
Among the areas in which the common-law courts interfered with freedom
of contract were the mortgagor's equity of redemption, and sales of reversionary interests. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 482-83
(1909).
7Ibid. See Astley v. Reynolds, 2 Str. 915, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (K.B. 1732).
8 Dazell, supra note 6, at 237.
9 5 WLLISToN, CONTRAcTS § 1603, at 4495 (rev. ed. 1937). See also
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 495 (1932).
10 See, e.g., Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.Y. 99 (1854) (threat to withhold
property until fare was paid in full thereby cutting off prior right to rebate) ;
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Areas in which economic duress has been recognized in New
York are where: a common carrier exacted unreasonable terms for
the performance of a service, 1 threats by governmental agencies have
induced a party to enter into an agreement,' 2 a party to a contract
threatens a breach which in effect would cause irreparable harm to
the other party to the contract, 3 a wife demanded property before
she would fulfill her prior valid agreement to sign all deeds as asked,
thereby releasing her right to dower,14 a void tax has been.paid to
prevent seizure or levy on real property.' 5
In the instant case, although the Court recognized that the
owner of property is free to sell to whomever he wishes, the Court
held that the plaintiffs' actions were wrongful, not necessarily in a
legal, but in a moral or equitable sense. The Court stated:
[W]here a party for purely malicious and unconscionable motives
threatens to resell such a home to a purchaser, specially selected because he
would be undesirable, for the sole purpose of injuring the builder's business,
fundamental fairness requires the conclusion that his conduct in making 6this
threat be deemed "wrongful," as the term is used in the law of duress.'
Concededly, if duress'is to be tested, not by the nature of the
threats, but biV the state of mind induced in the victim, 17 any type
of action which is wrongful in any sense might result in duress.
The type of "duress" exercised in the instant case, however, is distinguishable from those normally recognized in the area of economic
resulting from a threat to sell to an
compulsion. The damage
"undesirable party"' 8 is speculative and dependent upon the actions
of third persons, whereas, for example, in the case of a threat to

wrongfully breach an existing contract the damage is direct and depends upon the action of the person making the threats. In addition, in view of the decision of Shelly v. Kramer,'9 which held that
Rose v. Owen, 42 Ind. App. 137, 85 N.E. 129 (1908) (threat to apply for a
receiver of a corporation); Chandler v. Sanger, 114 Mass. 364, 19 Am. Rep.
36711(1874) (attachment of perishable property).
Baldwin v. Liverpool & G.W.S.S. Co., 74 N.Y. 125, 30 Am. Rep. 277

(1878).

12 American Dist Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 578,
211 N.Y. Supp. 262 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd norn., 243 N.Y. 565, 154 N.E. 607
(1926).
13 Criterion Holding Co. v. Cerussi, 140 Misc. 855, 250 N.Y. Supp. 735
(Sup. Ct. 1931).
14 Van Dyke v. Wood, 60 App. Div. 208, 70 N.Y. Supp. 324 (1st Dep't
1901).
15 Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732
(1928).
16 Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625, 630 (1959).
17 See Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (1956).
IsThe phrase "undesirable party" is neither defined nor is an example
thereof given in the report of the case. In light of this lack of clarity it
may be assumed that the content of the threat was of a racial or religious
nature.
19334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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enforcement by a state court of a privately created racially discriminatory restrictive covenant or agreement relative to the ownership
or occupancy of land is "state action," which violates a thereby excluded person's rights under the equal .protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, 20 it is surprising that the Court in the present
case recognized that the threat to sell to an "undesirable party"
constituted duress. Although doing what a person has a legal right
to do, when done in a wrongful manner may constitute duress, it
would seem that the judicial taboo in the area of enforcing covenants
and agreements concerning discrimination in housing should have
precluded the Court from holding as it did.
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prominent naval officer delivered several addresses on
the subject of naval technical advances, coupled with remarks on the
state of education in this country. In an action for declaratory judgment, a publishing house, seeking to quote from these speeches without the author's permission, alleged that the material was official
government property and thus by statute I not subject to copyright.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held
that even though some of the material was gained from the author's
official relationships and paid for in part by the government, the
property rights remained in the author and consequently were protected by copyright. Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover, 177
F. Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959).
In 1854 the House of Lords, in Jefferys v. Boosey 2 recognized
that common-law copyright after publication had never, in fact,
existed. Previously, in 1834 the United States Supreme Court in
Wheaton v. Peters3 had held similarly, predicating its decision on
the constitutional provision for copyrights. 4 In view of this statutory
OFFICER.-A

U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV.
' 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1958). "No copyright shall subsist in the original text

20

of any work which is in the public domain . . . or in any publication of the
United States Government . . . ." Ibid.
2 See Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L. 815, 977, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 744 (1854).
See generally Rogers, A Chapter in the History of Literary Property; The
Booksellers' Fight for Perpetual Copyright, 5 Imu L. REv. 551, 559 (1911).
3 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 590, 660 (1834). See generally Rogers,
supra note 2, at 560.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause provides that Congress shall
have the power: "to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective

Writings and Discoveries.

. .

."

(Emphasis added.)

Wheaton v. Peters, supra note 3, at 660, construed the word "securing" to be

